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WHY SECTION 230 IS BETTER THAN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Eric Goldman*
47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”) immunizes Internet services from liability for
third-party content. This immunity acts as a crucial legal foundation for the modern
Internet. However, growing skepticism about the Internet has placed the immunity
in regulators’ sights.
If the First Amendment mirrors Section 230’s speech protections, narrowing
Section 230 would be inconsequential. This Essay explains why that is not the case.
Section 230 provides defendants with more substantive and procedural benefits than
the First Amendment does. Because the First Amendment does not backfill these
benefits, reductions to Section 230’s scope pose serious risks to Internet speech.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress enacted a major free speech law, Section 230.1 Section
230(c)(1) says Internet services categorically are not liable for third-party content,2
subject to a few statutory exceptions including intellectual property claims and
federal criminal prosecutions.3
Since 1996, the Internet has emerged as one of the most important innovations
ever. The Internet has created valuable, new user-generated content (UGC) services
that never existed in the offline world, such as Wikipedia’s crowdsourced
encyclopedia, consumer review websites like Yelp,4 and user-uploaded video sites
© 2019 Eric Goldman. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute
copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy
identifies the author, provides a citation to Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this
provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University
School of Law. Email: egoldman@gmail.com. Website: http://www.ericgoldman.org. I
appreciate comments from Cindy Cohn, Daniel Douglas, Charles Duan, David Gingras, Cary
Glynn, James Grimmelmann, Daphne Keller, Jeff Kosseff, Geoffrey Manne, Jess Miers, Brian
Pettis, David Post, Julio Sharp-Wasserman, and Rebecca Tushnet.
1 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT
CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
2 See Eric Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY (Giancarlo Frosio ed.,
forthcoming).
3 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
4 See Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 294 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds.,
2010).
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like YouTube. These UGC services provide Internet users with an unprecedented
ability to express themselves to a global audience. UGC services have also created
many private benefits, including new jobs5 and wealth.6
The emergence of UGC services, and their beneficial impact on society,
prompts an interesting counterfactual question: Did UGC succeed because of
Section 230, or would the First Amendment’s powerful protections for free speech
have produced similar outcomes without Congress’s intervention?
Recently, there has been some valorization of the counterfactual, as
commentators have argued that Section 230 is redundant with the First Amendment
(at least in part).7 If so, this implies Congress could modify Section 230 without
jeopardizing the Internet because the First Amendment would backfill gaps in
Section 230’s immunity. 8 Indeed, Congress recently reduced Section 230’s
immunity9 and seems destined to reduce it more.10
However, the counterfactual is almost certainly not true. The First Amendment
and Section 230 are not substitutes for each other. This Essay explains how Section
230 provides significant and irreplaceable substantive and procedural benefits
beyond the First Amendment’s free speech protections.11 Because the First
Amendment does not backfill these benefits, reducing Section 230’s immunity poses
major risks to online free speech and the associated benefits to society. 12

5 Cf. Christian M. Dippon, Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role of
Liability Protections, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (June 5, 2017), https://cdn1.
internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Economic-Value-of-Internet-Intermediariesthe-Role-of-Liability-Protections.pdf.
6 Cf. David Post, A Bit of Internet History, or How Two Members of Congress Helped
Create a Trillion or So Dollars of Value, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/27/a-bit-of-internethistory-or-how-two-members-of-congress-helped-create-a-trillion-or-so-dollars-of-value/.
7 See, e.g., Cary Glynn, Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2027, 2028 (2018); Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Note, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act and the Common Law of Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 195, 240 (2018); cf. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels:
An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 478 (2010) (suggesting that common law may protect defendants
more than Section 230 does); Brian L. Frye, The Possible Redundancy of §230, LAW.COM (Nov.
10,
2017),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/the-possibleredundancy-of-%C2%A7230/ (comparing Section 230 to defamation’s republication rule).
8 E.g., Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 7, at 198 (“[I]f § 230(c)(1) were repealed in reaction
to those applications, intermediaries’ exposure to defamation liability, in particular, would not
change measurably.”).
9 See Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 279, 280 (2019).
10 Goldman, supra note 2.
11 See
James
Grimmelmann,
No
ESC,
LAW.COM
(Nov.
10,
2017),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/no-esc/ (calling Section 230 “the
21st-century First Amendment”).
12 Modifications to Section 230 could themselves trigger First Amendment scrutiny, a topic
beyond this Essay’s scope.
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The Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses how legislatures sometimes
statutorily supplement the First Amendment with laws like Section 230. Parts II and
III identify Section 230’s substantive and procedural benefits, respectively,
compared to the First Amendment. Part IV discusses some policy implications.
I.

SPEECH-ENHANCING STATUTES

The First Amendment is a globally unique protection for free speech. It
establishes an inviolable baseline of free speech in the United States. However, the
First Amendment only sets a floor, not a ceiling, on free speech protections in the
United States. Legislatures can enhance speech by extending the First Amendment
with what I call “speech-enhancing statutes.” 13 Four examples of such statutes
include the following:
1. Reporter shield laws protect reporters from being obligated to disclose
their confidential sources, which facilitates the gathering and publishing
of sensitive or legally risky information.14
2. Anti-SLAPP laws procedurally expedite the dismissal of lawsuits
targeting socially beneficial speech.15
3. Defamation retraction-demand statutes require plaintiffs to demand, and
be denied, a retraction before bringing a defamation lawsuit.16
4. The Consumer Review Fairness Act (CRFA), and analogous state laws,
prohibit businesses from banning consumer reviews.17
The justification for speech-enhancing statutes is clear when the laws extend
the First Amendment. For example, anti-SLAPP laws and defamation retractiondemand statutes create procedural hurdles to speech-related lawsuits that the First
Amendment does not require. The CRFA governs private vendor-customer
contracts, which typically do not receive First Amendment scrutiny at all.
However, other speech-enhancing statutes, such as the reporter shield law,
largely codify First Amendment jurisprudence. Why do legislatures enact these
laws?18
Using Section 230 as a case study, this Essay partially answers that question.
Irrespective of its substantive coverage, a speech-enhancing statute may offer
valuable procedural benefits. The next two Parts show how Section 230 has both

13 Professor James Grimmelmann calls it “subconstitutional free speech law.” See
Grimmelmann, supra note 11.
14 See, e.g., Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure
of Confidential Sources or Information, 99 A.L.R.3d § 2[a] (1980).
15 See, e.g., 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9:107 (2d ed. 2007).
16 See John Francis Major, Sufficiency of Retraction of Defamatory Statement, 40 AM. JUR.
2D Proof of Facts § 3 (last updated Aug. 2019).
17 See Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act, 24 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017).
18 To be clear, legislatures provide statutory supplements to constitutional rights in other
areas, such as how the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts extend the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
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substantive and procedural benefits for free speech and how that advances usergenerated content beyond what the First Amendment could achieve.
II.

SECTION 230’S SUBSTANTIVE BENEFITS

This Part describes how Section 230 provides more substantive protection for
free speech than the First Amendment requires.
A. Section 230 Covers Defamation and Much More
Defamation is Section 230’s paradigmatic application. Section 230 directly
responded to two early online defamation cases, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.19
and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Service Co.20 The Fourth Circuit’s Zeran v.
AOL ruling,21 the seminal case that read Section 230 broadly, 22 was essentially a
defamation case.
We can only speculate if the First Amendment and Section 230 produce the
same substantive outcomes for online defamation law.23 Section 230 overlaid UGC
defamation cases from the Internet’s earliest commercial days. This prevented the
development of a jurisprudence applying the First Amendment defense to
defamation claims for UGC. Thus, we never got enough data points to confidently
predict if Section 230 and the First Amendment would treat UGC defamation cases
the same.24
Despite defamation’s centrality to Section 230’s creation, defamation is only a
small piece of Section 230’s scope.25 Section 230 covers many doctrines beyond
defamation.
Indeed, courts routinely interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based on
third-party content (other than those referenced in Section 230’s statutory

19 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
20 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
21 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
22 Eric Goldman & Jeff Kosseff, Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Internet Law’s
Most Important Judicial Decision, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.
law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/commemorating-the-20th-anniversary-ofinternet-laws-most-important-judicial-decision/.
23 Compare Frye, supra note 7, with KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 95 (“[Zeran’s] interpretation
of Section 230 was so broad that it exceeded the standard First Amendment protections afforded to
publishers. Zeran turned Section 230 into a nearly impenetrable super-First Amendment for online
companies.”).
24 For examples of cases that suggest how UGC jurisprudence might look without Section
230, see Weigand v. NLRB, 783 F.3d 889, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d
661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014); Roe v. Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2016);
Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 193 (D. Me. 2008); and Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.,
94 N.Y.2d 242, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
25 Section 230’s broad cross-doctrinal application makes any assessment of the Section
230/defamation overlap unhelpfully incomplete. See Glynn, supra note 7, at 2048; SharpWasserman, supra note 7, at 241.
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exclusions), regardless of what causes of action the plaintiff actually alleges.26 As a
result, Section 230 has been invoked in cases involving negligence; deceptive trade
practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the common-law privacy torts;
tortious interference with contract or business relations; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and dozens of other legal doctrines.27
Some of these claims have strong First Amendment defenses, analogous to the
defamation jurisprudence.28 However, for other claims, First Amendment defenses
have little or no effect. Section 230 equally immunizes all of these claims, so it
clearly provides more protection for those claims with limited or weak First
Amendment defense.29
B. Section 230 Fully Protects Commercial Speech
Section 230 and the First Amendment handle commercial speech differently.
The First Amendment only requires a reduced level of scrutiny for commercial
speech, usually intermediate scrutiny (instead of strict scrutiny) for truthful
commercial speech 30 and minimal or no First Amendment protection for false
commercial speech.31
In contrast, Section 230 does not distinguish between commercial speech and
other types of speech, treating both types of speech equally.32 For example, Section
230 has protected Internet services from liability for publishing third-party online
advertisements,33 and Section 230 has long protected online marketplace operators
from liability for third-party listings of goods and services.34

26 See, e.g., Twitter, Inc. v. Super. Ct. for S.F., 2018 BL 516706, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
17, 2018).
27 4 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 37.05[1][C] (2d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated Jan. 2019); Ardia, supra note 7, at 427–28.
28 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light invasion of privacy).
29 See Jeff Kosseff, First Amendment Protection for Online Platforms, 35 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 199, 206–10 (2019).
30 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 2
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:10, Westlaw (database
updated Apr. 2019).
31 See SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 20:15.
32 Though it may seem counterintuitive for Section 230 to protect commercial speech, this
has spurred the development of online marketplaces that benefit society by improving market
efficiency and reducing consumer costs.
33 See, e.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Ramey v.
Darkside Prods., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10107 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004); Cisneros v. Yahoo!
Inc., CGC-04-433518 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2008).
34 See, e.g., Stoner v. eBay Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 7,
2000); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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By treating commercial and noncommercial speech equally, Section 230
avoids the commercial speech doctrine’s incoherency. 35 It also means that
commercial speech gets more protection under Section 230 than it would under the
First Amendment.
C. Scienter Is Irrelevant to Section 230
Section 230(c)(1)’s immunity does not vary with the Internet service’s
scienter.36 If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant “knew” about tortious or criminal
content, the defendant can still qualify for Section 230’s immunity.37
The First Amendment does not require this result.38 For example, in Smith v.
California,39 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a retail
bookseller from being strictly liable for criminal obscenity.40 However, any scienter
about obscenity could have exposed the bookseller to liability.
Similarly, the First Amendment sometimes prevents strict liability for
defamation,41 but sufficient scienter can override any First Amendment protection.42
For example, a plaintiff can win a defamation case involving matters of public
concern and public figures—the defamation claims most strongly protected by the
First Amendment—if it proves the defendant’s “actual malice.” 43 In contrast,
Section 230’s immunity applies to actual malice allegations. 44
The First Amendment also permits distributors of defamatory content to face
liability when they have the requisite scienter—that is, they knew or should have
known of the defamation. 45 Indeed, the two pre-Section 230 online distributor
defamation cases (Cubby and Stratton Oakmont) applied that reasoning. In practice,
this legal standard would turn defamation into a notice-and-takedown regime. In

35 E.g., REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING & MARKETING LAW 45–46
(2018).
36 In contrast, Section 230(c)(2), a safe harbor from liability for content removals, requires
the defendant’s “good faith.” See Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C.
§230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659, 661 (2012).
37 See, e.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 726 (“Because § 230(c)(1) contains
no good faith requirement, courts do not allow allegations of intent or knowledge to defeat a motion
to dismiss.”); see also Goldman, supra note 2.
38 See Kosseff, supra note 29.
39 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
40 Id. at 152, 155.
41 See SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 23:1.
42 See KOSSEFF, supra note 1, at 27.
43 SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 23:3 & nn.14–15. But see McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675,
676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“If the Constitution does not require
public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should
we.”).
44 See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (2006) (concluding that the defendant
successfully defended on Section 230 grounds despite allegations that she acted maliciously).
45 SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:92.
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contrast, Section 230 categorically rejects notice-and-takedown, as Zeran expressly
indicated.46
By mooting inquiries into defendants’ scienter, Section 230 provides greater
substantive protection for defendants in both defamation and nondefamation cases.
III.

SECTION 230’S PROCEDURAL BENEFITS

The prior Part explained how Section 230 expands the First Amendment’s
substantive scope. This Part explores how Section 230 provides extra procedural
benefits to defendants. While the First Amendment sometimes mandates procedural
as well as substantive rules,47 Section 230 offers more procedural protections, and
greater legal certainty, for defendants. These procedural benefits help even in
situations where the substantive scope of Section 230 and the First Amendment are
identical.
A. Section 230 Enables Early Dismissals
A prima facie Section 230(c)(1) defense typically has three elements: (1) the
defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service, (2) the claim
relates to information provided by another information content provider, and (3) the
claim treats the defendant as the publisher or speaker of the information.48
Often, judges can resolve all three elements based solely on the allegations in
the plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, courts can, and frequently do, grant motions to
dismiss based on a Section 230(c)(1) defense.49 In jurisdictions with anti-SLAPP50
laws, courts can grant anti-SLAPP motions to strike based on Section 230 without
allowing discovery in the case.51 For cases that reach discovery, Section 230 may
materially narrow the disputed facts and scope of discovery.

46 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 524 U.S.
937 (1998) (“Liability upon notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the
CDA.”).
47 See e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (stating the
First Amendment requires that plaintiff bears the burden of showing falsity and fault in order to
recover damages).
48 See e.g., Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2018); BALLON, supra note
27, § 37.05[3][A].
49 See BALLON, supra note 27, § 37.05[7] (“Courts increasingly have been willing to address
CDA immunity (at least under section 230(c)(1)) at the outset of a case.”).
50 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” GEORGE
W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 2–3 (1996).
Typically, SLAPPs inhibit the defendant’s right to petition the government or otherwise express
themselves in socially important ways. See What is a SLAPP?, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT,
https://anti-slapp.org/what-is-a-slapp (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). In response, anti-SLAPP laws
typically provide procedural “fast lanes” for dismissing SLAPPs and include an attorneys’ fee shift
to a successful defendant. See Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CTR.,
https://www.medialaw.org/topics-page/anti-slapp?tmpl=component&print=1 (last visited Oct. 3,
2019).
51 See BALLON, supra note 27, § 37.02[3].
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It matters a lot that Section 230(c)(1)’s prima facie elements do not reference
defendant scienter. Otherwise, plaintiffs could allege that scienter—with minimal
or no factual support—and often survive a motion to dismiss, get into discovery, and
delay resolution of the case to summary judgment or later.
This dynamic occurs in Section 230(c)(1)’s sibling, Section 230(c)(2), which
provides a safe harbor for a service’s content-removal and content-filtering
decisions. Unlike Section 230(c)(1), the Section 230(c)(2) safe harbor requires
defendant good faith. 52 Plaintiffs can allege the defendant’s bad faith in their
complaints, which makes courts reluctant to grant Section 230(c)(2) motions to
dismiss.53 Not surprisingly, Section 230(c)(2)’s higher litigation burdens discourage
defendants from relying upon it.
Section 230(c)(1)’s early dismissals are valuable to defendants.54 They reduce
the defendant’s out-of-pocket costs to defeat an unmeritorious claim.55 For smaller
Internet services, defending a single protracted lawsuit may be financially ruinous.56

52 The provision reads:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or avail ability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected . . . .
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
53 See BALLON, supra note 27, § 37.05[4][B] (positing that defendants face “potential
difficulty . . . obtaining dismissal of a claim pursuant to section 230(c)(2)(A), which requires a
showing of good faith, voluntary action, which usually requires evidence from the defendant, either
in support of a motion for summary judgment or, if controverted by evidence presented by the
plaintiff, at trial”); see also Goldman, supra note 36, at 666 (“Deferential courts may refuse to grant
§ 230(c)(2) immunity on a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff alleges a lack of good faith, which
gives plaintiffs the chance to hunt for evidence and imposes additional advocacy and discovery
costs on the defendant.”).
54 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases
where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the illegality.
Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of
section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that
they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties.”);
accord Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175) (“We thus aim to resolve the question of § 230
immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity protects websites not only
from ‘ultimate liability,’ but also from ‘having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.’”).
55 See
ENGINE,
SECTION
230:
COST
REPORT,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/5c6c5649e2c483b67d51829
3/1550603849958/Section+230+cost+study.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019) (getting into discovery
raises Section 230 defense costs from a minimum of fifteen thousand dollars to a minimum of one
hundred thousand dollars).
56 See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Veoh Files for Bankruptcy After Fending Off Infringement
Charges, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/02/veoh-files-for-bankruptcyafter-fending-off-infringement-charges/ (noting that Veoh, a YouTube competitor, ran out of
money while defending copyright claims before the courts confirmed it qualified for the online
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Also, complex litigation can divert substantial managerial and organizational
attention and mindshare from maintaining or enhancing the service. Thus, the ability
of a defendant to resolve a case on a motion to dismiss (and avoiding expensive
discovery) protects small and low-revenue Internet services, which in turn enhances
the richness and diversity of the Internet ecosystem.57
Section 230(c)(1)’s early dismissals also benefit society in several ways. First,
from a judicial economy standpoint, they save both parties from wasting valuable
resources on doomed litigation. They also take meritless litigation off court dockets,
freeing up the courts to handle other cases more carefully or quickly.
Second, Internet services rarely make a lot of money from any single item of
third-party content, so they lack financial incentives to stand behind individual
items. Also, the services often lack the contextual information necessary to properly
defend third-party content in court.58
Accordingly, the most economically rational decision for most Internet
services is to capitulate to any lawsuit over UGC—or avoid the lawsuit altogether
by quickly removing third-party content in response to prelitigation demands,
without any investigation or pushback. This causes “collateral censorship”: the
proactive removal of legitimate content as a prophylactic way of reducing potential
legal risk and the associated potential defense costs.59
Unmeritorious quick removals are common in online copyright law,60 because
the UGC copyright safe harbor61 is less favorable to defendants than Section 230
is.62 In contrast, Internet services routinely stand up to noncopyright legal threats,

copyright safe harbor); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d
1006, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming that Veoh was not violating the law).
57 Admittedly, granting motions to dismiss increases the risk of erroneous plaintiff losses,
especially where discovery would have produced inculpatory evidence. This highlights the costbenefit tradeoffs of all substantive and procedural doctrines that encourage courts to resolve cases
early.
58 See Venkat Balasubramani & Eric Goldman, In Its “Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the
Ninth Circuit Is Guilty of Judicial Activism–Garcia v. Google, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 27,
2014),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-innocence-of-muslims-ruling-theninth-circuit-is-guilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm (“Google stood in the movie
producer’s shoes trying to defend his behavior. But Google wasn’t a party to their conversations
or their transactions, and Google’s interest isn’t in defending the movie but in avoiding liability for
third party content.”); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
59 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2295, 2298 (1999); Glynn, supra note 7, at 2035–42; Kosseff, supra note 29, at 213; Felix T. Wu,
Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293,
295–96 (2013).
60 E.g., JENNIFER URBAN ET AL, NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 88, 116–
17 (2017), https://illusionofmore.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Berkeley_Columbia-on-512takedown.pdf.
61 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
62 See generally Eric Goldman, How the DMCA’s Online Copyright Safe Harbor Failed, 18
KOR. U. L. REV. 103 (2015) (discussing some of the ways the DMCA safe harbor was undermined).
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legal demands, and cease-and-desist letters targeting UGC—because Section 230
provides them legal certainty at a relatively low cost.63
Unlike Section 230, constitutional litigation is rarely quick or cheap. In
particular, courts are reluctant to resolve constitutional arguments on motions to
dismiss. Further, constitutional doctrines often raise sufficient factual questions that
courts wait until summary judgment (or later) before disposing of an unmeritorious
case. Thus, Internet services will expect it to cost less to defend UGC via Section
230 than the First Amendment, which makes the services more willing to stand up
for their users. And if Section 230 and the First Amendment both equally dictate
the defense wins, society as a whole benefits from reaching that result as quickly
and cheaply as possible.
The services’ Section 230–aided commitment to their UGC especially benefits
content from marginalized communities.64 Not only are marginalized voices more
likely to be targeted by people in positions of power, but Internet services are less
likely to worry about marketplace or reputational consequences of removing content
from marginalized communities. Compared to the First Amendment, Section 230
helps keep more “at risk” legitimate content online.
B. Section 230 Is More Predictable for Litigants than the First Amendment
For defendants, there is a disproportionately large difference between one
hundred percent confidence of victory and ninety-five percent confidence of victory.
Ninety-five percent confidence means the defendant must calculate the potential
economic risk (five percent chance of loss multiplied by a range of expected
damages) and the expected defense costs through numerous litigation stages. If the
five percent chance involves a potential total exposure of one hundred million
dollars, the case has five-million-dollar expected value. When they face unlikely
but massive financial exposure, many rational defendants will settle to ensure the
business’ survival, rather than “risk it all.”
Meanwhile, it can be economically rational for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring
cases with only a five percent chance of success. If the lawyer brings twenty of
those cases, expecting to win one, the winnings from the single successful case could
cover the costs of the nineteen failed cases. But plaintiffs’ lawyers usually steer
clear of a case that has a one hundred percent chance of failure.
First Amendment defenses may be ninety-five percent certain, but they are
rarely one hundred percent certain. That minor difference will induce defendants to
settle cases that are almost certainly unmeritorious. In contrast, a Section 230
defense sometimes is so obvious, backed by decades of precedential defense wins,
that defendants will treat victory as one hundred percent assured. They are less
likely to settle those cases, even for a fraction of defense costs.

63 See Eric Goldman & Jessica M. Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU L. Rev.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351348. Where available, antiSLAPP laws help by increasing the odds the Internet service will get its attorneys’ fees paid. See
id. at 11.
64 See Glynn, supra note 7, at 2041, 2047.
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C. Section 230 Inhibits Plaintiff Plead-Arounds
Usually, Section 230 immunizes all claims applicable to a set of facts,
irrespective of the precise claims asserted by plaintiffs. Whether the plaintiff pleads
defamation, negligence, tortious interference, unfair competition, or infliction of
emotional distress, the defendant wins if the lawsuit is based on third-party content
and Section 230’s statutory exceptions do not apply.65 The few common-law claims
that Section 230 does not cover, such as promissory estoppel 66 or failure to warn,67
typically fail on their prima facie elements.68
In theory, the First Amendment works the same way. If a lawsuit targets the
defendant’s speech, the First Amendment should apply regardless of the plaintiff’s
claims. That’s not what happens in practice. Each legal doctrine has its own First
Amendment defense elements, and the defendant must navigate all of these
requirements to successfully defeat the lawsuit.69 This increases defense costs and
reduces certainty of the outcome.
D. Section 230 Moots State-Level Conflicts of Laws
Many laws, such as defamation, privacy invasions, and unfair competition,
have significant state-by-state differences. Ordinarily, Internet services would incur
substantial costs to identify these variations and then deploy state-by-state versions
of their services, so they may rationally choose to comply with the lowest common
denominator. Section 230 preempts conflicting state law 70 and moots these

65 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hat matters is not
the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of
emotional distress—what matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to
treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another. To put it another
way, courts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from
the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’ If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes
liability.”); accord Taylor v. Twitter, Inc., CGC 18-564460, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 92, at *18–
19, *28–29 (Cal. Super. Ct. March 8, 2019) (saying that California courts look at the practical
realities of plaintiffs’ allegations, not the specific cause of actions they assert).
66 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1109.
67 Doe 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016); Beckman v.
Match.com, 668 Fed. App’x 759, 760 (9th Cir. 2016).
68 Both the Doe 14 and Beckman cases ultimately failed on their elements. Beckman v.
Match.com, LLC, 743 Fed. App’x 142 (9th Cir. 2018); Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 2:12cv-03626, 2016 BL 498065 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016); accord Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 306 F. Supp.
3d 579, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 2017 WL 5665670, at *11–
15 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
69 Cf. William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008)
(describing a similar problem with fair use defenses to trademark infringement).
70 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012).
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differences. 71 Internet services can comply with a single national standard, 72
increasing their legal certainty and reducing their legal compliance costs. 73
E. Section 230 Facilitates Constitutional Avoidance
Courts try to avoid ruling on constitutional grounds and instead prefer to decide
cases on any other ground if possible, a doctrine called “constitutional avoidance.”74
Among other reasons, constitutional interpretations can have unexpected
consequences, and elected legislators are in a better position to anticipate and
balance those considerations than unelected judges deciding a single case at bar.
Furthermore, constitutional interpretations reduce legislators’ future scope of
actions, so constitutional avoidance preserves the legislature’s power to superintend
the law as society evolves.
This means that courts much prefer to rely on statutory grounds like Section
230 instead of interpreting the First Amendment, even if the substantive results
would be the same. To the extent Section 230 statutorily “codifies” constitutional
principles, it enables courts to advance constitutional free speech interests while
respecting constitutional avoidance.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Though Congress retains the power to superintend Section 230, it should wield
that power infrequently and with precision. This Essay exposes numerous ways
Congress could unintentionally undercut Section 230’s benefits and hurt the Internet.
First, Section 230 derives a lot of its strengths from its “horizontal” application
to disparate causes of action. Defendants benefit from litigating only a single
defense rather than navigating multiple prima facie elements and defenses. If
Congress excludes more causes of action from Section 230’s coverage, it increases
defense costs, creates more constitutional litigation (as defendant now turn to the
First Amendment as a backup defense), and encourages plaintiffs to shoehorn their
claims into the new exclusion. Instead of adding new exceptions, Congress should
enact other horizontal cross-doctrine speech-enhancing defenses, like a federal antiSLAPP law.
71 Cf. Grimmelman, supra note 11 (discussing how Section 230 moots many of the doctrinal
complexities in defamation law).
72 But see Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 7, at 233, 235–36 (arguing that circuit-by-circuit
differences in Section 230 jurisprudence undermine its uniformity).
73 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (“While the scope
of federal intellectual property law is relatively well-established, state laws protecting ‘intellectual
property,’ however defined, are by no means uniform. Such laws may bear various names, provide
for varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying purposes and policy goals. Because
material on a website may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time,
permitting the reach of any particular state’s definition of intellectual property to dictate the
contours of this federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of insulating the
development of the Internet from the various state-law regimes.”).
74 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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Second, Section 230’s agnosticism about defendant scienter is a key element
of its success. Introducing scienter into Section 230, even just a little, erodes or
wipes out most of Section 230’s procedural benefits.
We saw this effect from Congress’ most recent change to Section 230, the
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”).75
FOSTA sought to protect victims of sex trafficking by adding new exceptions to
Section 230, including several that depend on a defendant’s scienter. 76 FOSTA
almost certainly did not benefit sex trafficking victims; and the changes to Section
230 caused numerous Internet services to eliminate some offerings or exit the market
entirely.77 Literally, FOSTA shrunk the Internet.
FOSTA’s failings also highlight the risks of incorporating complex fact-based
inquiries into Section 230. Consider, for example, a recent proposal that Section
230 should apply only to defendants who act reasonably.78 This idea might sound
“reasonable” enough, but it’s a radical change that would destroy Section 230.
Putting aside how the change would reduce Section 230’s substantive immunity,
such amorphous eligibility standards would negate or completely eliminate Section
230’s procedural benefits. It would make Section 230 litigation far less predictable,
and it would require expensive and lengthy factual inquiries into all evidence
probative of the reasonableness of defendant’s behavior. Like FOSTA, these
procedural losses will lead to the elimination or exit of Internet services—but on a
much wider scale, because an across-the-board good-faith or reasonableness
requirement would reach much further than FOSTA’s specific exclusions. Such
requirements would also cause more collateral censorship, as Internet services
remove legitimate borderline content to safely ensure a future judge might consider
their efforts “reasonable” or “in good faith.”79
CONCLUSION
This Essay mirrors the broader debate over rules versus standards.80 Section
230 is like a rule; First Amendment defenses are like standards. If the First
Amendment’s standards would always reach the same substantive result as Section
230, we should prefer the rule to increase predictability and reduce adjudication
75 Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-164,
132 Stat. 1253 (2018).
76 Goldman, supra note 9, at 284.
77 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Who Benefited from FOSTA? (Spoiler: Probably No One), TECH.
& MKTG. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2019), https://blog. ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/01/who-benefitedfrom-fosta-spoiler-probably-no-one.htm.
78 Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017).
79 James Grimmelmann, To Err Is Platform, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Apr.
6, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform (“[F]or any exception to immunity, the
standard of liability must be clear so platforms on the right side of the line can win their cases
cheaply and reliably.”).
80 See, e.g., Sharp-Wasserman, supra note 7, at 237–40. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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costs. But Section 230 substantively protects more speech than the First
Amendment, and the First Amendment will not adequately backfill any reductions
in Section 230’s protections.
Section 230’s success as legislative policy is attributable to subtle and
counterintuitive factors. Developments like FOSTA show that Congress does not
fully grasp Section 230’s doctrinal “hydraulics” or why Section 230 succeeds. By
recognizing how Section 230 complements the First Amendment, Congress may be
able to avoid ruining one of its legislative masterworks.

